



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

nary risks but also to such special dangers as it may reasonably be supposed he was familiar with. If a servant chooses to enter into an employment involving danger he assumes the risk even though the master might have avoided the danger. This being true of an unskilled laborer, the rule is even more strictly enforced against a skilled laborer. *Foley v. Jersey City Electric Light Co.*, 54 N. J. Law 411, 24 Atl. Rep. 487; *Chandler v. Coast City Electric Railway Co.*, 61 N. J. Law 380; 39 Atl. Rep. 674; *Johnson v. Devoe Snuff Co.*, 62 N. J. Law 417, 41 Atl. Rep. 936; *McDonald v. Standard Oil Co.*, 69 N. J. Law 445, 55 Atl. Rep. 289; *Coyle v. Griffing Iron Co.*, 63 N. J. Law 609, 44 Atl. Rep. 665, 47 L. R. A. 147. See also *Beal v. Bryant*, 58 Atl. Rep. 428; *Dill v. Marmon*, 71 N. E. Rep. 669.

PARTNERSHIP—SUIT AGAINST PARTNERSHIP IN FIRM NAME.—The statutes of New Mexico provide that a partnership may sue and be sued in the firm name and that service on one member is service on the firm. In an action against a firm the caption read "A versus G., H. & K., partners under the firm name of 'G. & Co.'" Service had been made on one of the partners. *Held*, an action against the individuals and not against the partnership. *Good v. Red River Valley Co.* (1904), — N. M. —, 78 Pac. Rep. 46.

At common law a partnership had no standing as a legal entity aside from its individual members. Many of the states, however, have passed statutes permitting the partnership to sue and be sued in its firm name. The New Mexico law is patterned after a similar section in the Iowa Code and is typical of the legislation on this point. It would seem that inasmuch as the statutes are a relaxation of the old law, a liberal interpretation should overlook so technical a point—especially when the intent is so clearly expressed as in the case under discussion. While the courts show a tendency to modify the common law rule, yet the weight of authority is that a suit against a partnership must be so designated, and that words such as those mentioned are mere *descriptio personae*. *Ladiga Saw Mill Co. v. Smith*, 78 Ala. 108; *Davidson v. Knox*, 67 Cal. 143. There are some cases to the contrary. In *Morrissey v. Schindler*, 18 Neb. 672, the facts were precisely the same as in the case under discussion but the court held that it was an action against the firm and that the form of expression there used was preferable to the use of the firm name alone. This holding has since been modified. *Winters v. Means*, 50 Neb. 209; *Wigton v. Smith*, 57 Neb. 299, 77 N. W. Rep. 772; *Bastian v. Adams*, 97 N. W. Rep. 231. As to the manner of designating plaintiffs in a partnership action see *McCord v. Seale*, 56 Cal. 262; *Sweet v. Ervin*, 54 Iowa 101; *Putnam v. Wheeler*, 65 Tex. 522; *Moses v. Hatfield*, 3 S. E. Rep. 538; *Wise v. Williams*, 72 Cal. 544.

RESULTING TRUST—INTENTION.—The plaintiff, relying on a written agreement with his wife, whereby it was provided that all their possessions, whether owned jointly or in severalty, should at the death of either become the property of the survivor, purchased land which he caused to be deeded to his wife and spent further sums in the payment of taxes and making improvements thereon, and also in improving other lands owned by the wife. Upon the contract being adjudged invalid under the law of Kentucky, *Held*,